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Should We be Moved  
by What Motivates Expressivism? 
Terence Cuneo 
University of Vermont 
 
Suppose we were to devise a metric that illustrates the degree to which 
metaethical positions are similar, situating these views in common con-
ceptual space. This metric might yield some surprises, such as the de-
gree to which moral fictionalism and T. M. Scanlon’s “relaxed realism” 
are similar.1 But it would also yield some predictable results, placing 
moral realism and expressivism, for example, at opposite ends of the 
metaethical spectrum. The rationale for situating realism and express-
ivism in this way would, moreover, be transparent, for these two views 
appear as different as metaethical views could be: realists say that moral 
judgments express genuine (or robust) moral propositional content; 
expressivists deny this. Realists say that these judgments represent the 
moral facts; expressivists deny this. Realists say that there are moral 
facts that are represented; expressivists demur. 
These differences between realism and expressivism are not 
superficial but are symptomatic of deep differences in philosophical 
temperament. Realists are impressed by the degree to which moral 
thought is similar to other domains of thought, such as thought about 
the external world, logic, and numbers, which appear to be straight-
forwardly representational. For it seems that when we engage in such 
thought, we aim to think about such things as trees, axioms, and prime 
numbers. Moreover, we often appear to succeed in this, ascertaining 
such things as that Dutch elm trees are endangered and that naïve set 
theory is inconsistent. In the moral case, realists maintain that things 
are similar. When we deliberate about what to do, realists claim that 
we aim to discover which courses of action are morally permissible and 
which are forbidden—the instantiation of these properties, by all 
appearances, are there waiting to be discovered. Often it seems that we 
get things right, as when we slowly over time came to realize that 
slavery is morally impermissible. 
                                                 
1 Enoch (2011, ch. 5) makes a case for the similarity between fictionalism and 
Scanlon’s view. I borrow the term “relaxed realism” from McGrath (2014).  
1
Cuneo: Should We be Moved  by What Motivates Expressivism?




Expressivists, for their part, find themselves impressed by the ways 
in which moral thought is discontinuous with thought about the exter-
nal world, logic, and numbers. These philosophers often mark the 
apparent contrast by noting that thought of the latter sort is theoretical; 
its aim is to expand our knowledge of how the world is, informing us 
about such things as seismic shifts and algebraic functions. Unlike 
thoughts about the external world, logical axioms, or numbers, ex-
pressivists maintain that moral thought is practical; its aim is to expand 
our knowledge not of what the world is like but of how to behave in 
the world as we know it.2 Because it is practical, expressivists note that 
it is no surprise that moral thought is often affectively-laden, express-
ing states of commendation or condemnation, as the case may be. 
These affectively-laden states, after all, are precisely the kinds of 
thoughts that move us to action or are expressed when we commend 
or condemn.  
When two views differ as sharply as do realism and expressivism, 
it is easy for their proponents to talk past one another, failing to 
understand the other’s most fundamental commitments. My project in 
this essay is to bring these two very different views into conversation. 
I begin by offering a more specific characterization of both expressiv-
ism and realism, noting where some of their important differences lie. 
I then identify the primary rationale that expressivists offer for reject-
ing moral realism in favor of their view, an argument that has a long 
history in the expressivist tradition, which I refer to as the Motivation 
Argument. While the Motivation Argument has been widely discussed, 
I present a strategy of response to it that, to my knowledge, realists 
have not exploited. This strategy is concessive in character; it doesn’t 
charge that some premise of the Motivation Argument is false or that 
expressivists have failed accurately to describe the phenomenology of 
the moral life. Rather, it contends that the Motivation Argument suf-
fers from a dialectical flaw that renders it unhelpful for furthering the 
expressivist cause. The moral I draw from the discussion is that ex-
                                                 
2 Chrisman (2008) and Gibbard (2012, ch. 10) state the contrast vividly.  
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pressivism might be true. And there might be good reasons to accept 
it. But the Motivation Argument is not one of them.3  
1. Characterizing two rival views 
Let me begin with some preliminary matters. Metaethicists tend to use 
the term “moral judgment” in a very inclusive sense to designate 
whatever state of mind that is expressed by the sincere utterance of 
moral sentences such as “It’s wrong to cheat friends of their earnings” 
and “I’m required to give a substantial percentage of my income to 
famine relief.” I’ll use this term in the same inclusive way. For present 
purposes, I’ll also distinguish judgments that have moral representa-
tional content from those that do not. A judgment has moral repre-
sentational content, I will assume, just in case it represents a moral 
fact—where representation is understood to be a genuine aboutness 
relation between mind and world whose nature might be understood 
or analyzed in different ways.4 When the representational content of a 
judgment successfully represents some state of the world, I will say 
that it accurately represents that state.   
I understand expressivism to be any view5 that endorses the 
following three claims: 
Moral judgments lack moral representational content. 
They do not represent moral reality, the moral facts. 
Rather, they express attitudes of approbation and dis-
approbation toward objects, including actions and 
people, in virtue of their having non-moral features of 
various sorts, such as their being altruistic.  
 
                                                 
3 While the argument I’ll present overlaps substantially with one offered in Cuneo 
(2014, ch. 4), it has seemed to me worthwhile to present the argument independently 
of the context and assumptions of that book’s discussion.   
4 I realize that some understand representation along deflationary lines, affirming that 
there is such a relation but that it has no nature. As the characterization of 
representation above indicates, I do not have representation so understood in mind.  
5 Blackburn (1993, introduction) characterizes expressivism as a research program. 
While I think there are significant advantages to thinking of expressivism in this way, 
I’ll speak of it here as a view.  
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Moral judgments do not represent and, so, do not ac-
curately represent moral reality, that is, the moral facts.  
 
There are no moral facts, at least as realists think of 
them.   
Moral realists reject each of the three claims embraced by expressivists. 
According to their view:  
Moral judgments have moral representational content. 
They represent moral reality, the moral facts.  
 
Some moral judgments accurately represent moral real-
ity, that is, the moral facts.  
 
There are moral facts. Some are accurately represented 
by moral judgments.  
I hasten to add that some realists believe that moral judgments may 
also express attitudes of approbation and disapprobation, as expressiv-
ists believe. If these philosophers are right, we can blend insights from 
both views.6 I will return to this point toward the end of our discus-
sion.  
I now introduce some refinements, beginning with expressivism. 
Despite their deep disagreements with realists, traditional expressivists 
agree with realists about this much: if there were any moral facts, they 
would be as realists say. More specifically, these philosophers maintain 
that if there were any moral facts, they would be as non-naturalist 
realists say, belonging to a sui generis non-natural realm.7 Unlike realists, 
however, traditional expressivists believe that there are no such facts; 
indeed, some are forthrightly dismissive of the claim that there are such 
facts, calling non-naturalistic realism “mumbo-jumbo.”8 A. J. Ayer, 
                                                 
6 See, among others, Copp (2001), Hare (2003), Boisvert (2008), and Schroeder 
(2009). 
7 This agreement is largely due to prominent representatives of both traditions 
endorsing some version of the Open Question Argument.  
8 Gibbard (2003, 192). Gibbard (2012, 239) calls the view “hocus pocus.” 
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Jonathan Bennett, and the early Allan Gibbard are examples of 
traditional expressivists.9  
Sophisticated expressivists, by contrast, advance a view that is both 
more nuanced and difficult to characterize. Unlike their traditionalist 
cohorts, these philosophers maintain that we can properly say that 
there are moral properties or moral facts so long as we understand such 
properties or facts in a sufficiently deflationary way. What does this 
mean? It is exceedingly difficult to say, but the rough idea is that these 
properties or facts would be sufficiently ontologically “lightweight” 
that they come for free with well-behaved moral predicates, and would 
play none of the explanatory roles typically reserved for moral facts.10 
So, for example, when presenting his favored version of quasi-realist 
expressivism, Simon Blackburn writes that G. E. Moore was right 
when he said that there is “almost nothing to say” about goodness. 
Goodness, writes Blackburn, “will indeed resist analysis, resist any ac-
count of empirical or causal access, and bear a relation of 
supervenience to other properties.” As with truth, Blackburn contin-
ues, we can say “that there is a property there, if properties are just the 
semantic shadows of predicates. But there is no topic there, no residual 
mystery, therefore, about how we get our hooks into it nor why we 
should want to do so.”11  
As I say, it is difficult to know what to make of these and other 
similar pronouncements. How should we understand the metaphor of 
moral properties being “shadows” of predicates? Are we to understand 
this to mean that moral properties depend on moral predicates much 
in the way that shadows depend on opaque objects? Or consider the 
claim that we can say that there are moral properties, so long as we 
understand them to be shadows. Is this best understood to be a 
metalinguistic thesis about what we are saying when we claim that there 
                                                 
9 See Ayer (1936), Bennett (1993), and Gibbard (1990).  
10 This last claim is somewhat controversial. I offer reasons in its favor in Cuneo 
(forthcoming).  
11 Blackburn (2010, 310-11). Elsewhere Blackburn (1993, 181) writes: “There is no 
harm in saying ethical predicates refer to properties, when such properties are merely 
the semantic shadows of the fact that they function as predicates. A quasi-realist 
protection of ethical truth protects ethical predicates, and if our overall semantic 
picture is that predicates refer to properties, so be it. But ethical predication remains 
an entirely different activity from naturalistic predication.” 
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are properties or an ontological thesis about the character of these 
properties themselves?  
I am not sure how best to answer these questions. Neither, so far 
as I can tell, are most other philosophers, some worrying that defla-
tionism provides no way to distinguish sophisticated expressivism 
from non-naturalist realism.12 Despite these difficulties about how to 
understand sophisticated expressivism—and I will have more to say 
about the view later—there seem to be two important differences 
between it and moral realism.  
One difference is that when offering an account of the workings 
of moral thought and discourse, sophisticated expressivists wish not 
to appeal to moral properties or facts; we are not to offer an account 
of the meaning of moral sentences in terms of them. In his later work, 
Allan Gibbard states his view as follows: “Expressivism…consists in a 
pattern of explanation.” What sort of explanation? Gibbard says that 
it is a pattern of explanation with regard to meanings. It covers “any 
account of meanings that follows this indirect path: to explain the 
meaning of a term, explain what states of mind the term can be used 
to express.”13 Filled out a little more, the idea seems to be that while 
we may end up saying that there are moral properties and facts, we do 
not explain moral thought and discourse in terms of them. Rather, we 
take the “indirect path” to which Gibbard refers in which, when 
explaining moral thought and discourse, we appeal to states of mind 
that lack moral representational content.  
Second, and relatedly, although sophisticated expressivists are will-
ing to talk of there being moral facts and of our knowing them, they 
deny that there is any substantial sense in which moral judgments 
represent these facts. In one place, Blackburn puts the matter like this:  
                                                 
12 Rosen (1998) and Dreier (2004) develop the worry.  
13 Gibbard (2003, 7). Elsewhere Gibbard writes: “The expressivist starts with states 
of mind, and uses these to elucidate normative beliefs or seeming beliefs … At the 
outset, in any expressivist’s scheme, the initial states of mind are explained not as 
beliefs with such-and-such content, but in some other way. They are psychologically, 
as sentiments or attitudes … or states of planning. The expressivist then tries to show 
that these states of mind act much like beliefs: it as if they were beliefs with a special 
content” (180-1).  
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I think expressivism needs something like the distinc-
tion between thin truth, or thin truth aptitude on the 
one hand, and a more ‘robust’ or substantive ‘thick’ 
concept of representation or description on the other. 
That is, expressivism can profit from minimalism [or 
deflationism] about truth, since this makes it easier to 
allow that normative utterances are true. But it needs 
them not to be representative or descriptive, so these 
must be regarded as thick notions, attaching only to a 
sub-class of indicative utterances in good propositional 
standing.14  
In another place, Blackburn writes:  
Yes, I am an anti-realist; no, this does not mean that 
there are no facts of an ethical or normative kind…. 
Quasi-realism…refuses to give ethical facts a typical 
explanatory role. This is already heralded when we turn 
our backs on ethical representation. A representation 
of something as F is typically explained by the fact that 
it is F. A representation answers to what is represented. 
I hold that ethical facts do not play this explanatory 
role.15  
The position voiced in these passages seems to be that, while sophist-
icated expressivists are happy to say that moral claims are true and that 
there are moral facts, these philosophers insist that moral claims do 
not have moral representational content; they are not “descriptive,” 
purporting to be about a realm of moral facts. Since they are not, moral 
facts are not, in their view, the sorts of thing that “answer to” the 
contents of moral judgments.   
This characterization of sophisticated expressivism raises a host of 
issues that call for explanation. On this occasion, however, let me rush 
                                                 
14 Blackburn (2001, 25). Blackburn (1998, ch. 3) takes a different approach, 
advocating deflationism about representation itself. Cuneo (2008) addresses this 
strategy.  
15 Blackburn (1999, 216).  
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by the issues it raises, turning to moral realism for the purpose of 
specifying somewhat more exactly how I understand the position.  
The type of realism on which I have my eye remains neutral regard-
ing two issues that divide realists from one another. First, some realists 
hold that moral facts are ordinary natural facts of the sort investigated 
by the usual sciences; others do not, maintaining that they are non-
natural. I will understand realism to be compatible with either of these 
positions. Second, some realists maintain that moral facts imply cat-
egorical reasons that apply to agents regardless of their contingent 
desires, goals, or social allegiances. Others do not, holding that moral 
facts generate reasons only when agents have contingent commitments 
of certain kinds. Realism, as I understand it, is compatible with either 
of these positions as well.  
While I understand realism to be neutral with respect to some 
important questions about the nature of moral facts or truths, I will 
understand it not to be neutral with regard to others.16 For I’ll 
understand the view to commit itself to certain claims about what sorts 
of moral facts there are. More specifically, I’ll understand realism to 
commit itself to there being a range of substantive first-order moral 
facts that (drawing from other work) I will term the moral fixed points.17  
To flesh out this idea, it will be helpful to have some terminology 
in hand. Suppose we say that a moral system is a reasonably 
comprehensive and consistent body of moral propositions regarding 
beings like us in a world such as ours. By a reasonably comprehensive body 
of moral propositions, I mean an array of propositions that concerns 
nearly all situations that agents like us might find themselves in, and 
imply—often in conjunction with empirical propositions—a range of 
moral assessments and recommendations for those situations. Beings 
like us are mortal, embodied, susceptible to physical, emotional and 
other psychological pleasures and pains, capable of introspection, of 
friendship, of self-esteem, possessed of some degree of empathy and 
sympathy, and able to reason in at least minimal ways. A world such as 
ours is one that is regulated by laws of nature and broad empirical 
                                                 
16 For present purposes, I will slide freely between talk of moral facts and moral 
truths. I believe there is a distinction between the two but marking it will not matter 
on this occasion.  
17 See Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014).  
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statistical generalizations that are at least close to the ones here on 
earth.  
It is possible that there are moral systems that govern beings very 
different from us, in worlds rather different from ours. And, for all I 
say here, there might be deviant moral systems that recommend such 
things as inflicting pain. To avoid focusing on such possibilities, I will 
say that a minimally eccentric moral system is one that does not incorp-
orate eccentric empirical assumptions about us and the world, such as 
the assumptions that we tend to like pain, that we are incapable of 
being deceived, that we ordinarily have absolutely no concern for the 
well-being of others, that upon death we are immediately bodily 
resurrected, and so forth. And I will assume that a non-deviant moral 
system is not one that morally recommends inflicting suffering on 
others or harming them but instead recommends alleviating suffering 
and not inflicting harm on others.  
Let us call substantive realism the view according to which any mini-
mally eccentric, non-deviant moral system must include the moral 
fixed points. Substantive realists maintain that the moral fixed points 
include propositions such as: 
It is wrong to recreationally slaughter fellow persons. 
 
It is wrong to break one’s promises simply because one 
feels like it.  
 
It is wrong to humiliate others simply for pleasure. 
 
It is wrong to torture others just because they have in-
convenienced you. 
 
It is wrong to impose severe burdens on others simply 
because of their physical appearance. 
  
9
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It is wrong to satisfy a mild desire if this requires killing 
many innocent people.18  
The moral fixed points may or may not lie at the theoretical found-
ation of a minimally eccentric, non-deviant moral system. For all I say 
here, they might, for example, be grounded in even moral general 
principles, such as Kant’s Formula of Humanity or Ross’s prima facie 
duties. However that may be, the fixed points constitute the boundaries 
of any such system, as nothing could count as a minimally eccentric, 
non-deviant moral system were it not to include these truths. By 
committing substantive realism to this claim, I realize that I am 
attributing to realism commitments that many other realists have not 
explicitly endorsed. Still, the version of realism just described is not 
without precedent. When Thomas Reid defended the claim that the 
“first principles of morality” are constitutive of competent moral 
thought, he endorsed a similar view.19 And when Philippa Foot argued 
against Hare’s position by calling attention to so-called thick evaluative 
predicates such as “rude” and “just,” whose application conditions are 
fixed by their descriptive content, she also defended a position similar 
to the one described. For Foot forcefully pressed the view that there 
are certain in-built conceptual constraints on what could qualify as rude 
or just behavior, guaranteeing that some actions, by definition, could 
not qualify as rude or just.20 Indeed, one could view the position 
articulated above as an attempt to apply Foot’s basic insight to the case 
of minimally eccentric, non-deviant moral systems. 
So, according to substantive realism (henceforth simply “realism”), 
any minimally eccentric, non-deviant moral system must include the 
moral fixed points. Realists add that the fixed points are also hold or 
are true. Indeed, they maintain that they are evidently true. To para-
phrase something that Sharon Street—who is no friend of realism—
says in another context, it seems almost crazy to deny them.21 
                                                 
18 I have stated the fixed points in such a way that they do not have any qualifications 
attached to them. It might be, however, that they should be understood to be 
defeasible. I’ll leave this possibility open here.  
19 See Reid (2010).  
20 Foot (2002, ch 8).  
21 Street (2016, 327).  
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The argument I am going to develop in the next section depends 
on the claim that the moral fixed points are excellent candidates for 
being moral truths constitutive of a minimally eccentric, non-deviant 
moral system. While there are a variety of moral fixed points, in what 
follows, it will be helpful to work with just one of those stated above. 
So, I will frame the discussion by employing the proposition I’ll call:  
No Slaughter: It is wrong to recreationally slaughter 
fellow persons.  
In what follows, No Slaughter will function as a paradigm case of a 
moral fixed point.  
2. The Motivation Argument 
While contemporary expressivists have offered a battery of arguments 
for their view, recent defenses of the position rely heavily on a single 
and historically influential line of argument, which claims that moral 
judgments are intrinsically motivating.22 Blackburn, for example, 
writes:  
The reason expressivism in ethics has to be correct is 
that if we supposed that belief, denial, and so on were 
simply discussions of a way the world is, we would still 
face the open question. Even if that belief were settled, 
there would still be issues of what importance to give 
it, what to do, and all the rest. For we have no con-
ception of a ‘truth condition’ or fact of which mere 
apprehension by itself determines practical issues. For 
any fact, there is a question of what to do about it.23 
                                                 
22 See Blackburn (1998, ch. 3), Gibbard (1990) and (2003, ch. 1), Horgan and 
Timmons (2000) and (2006), and Timmons (1999) for defenses of expressivism. 
Gibbard defends the intrinsically motivating character of judgments concerning the 
“all things considered ought.” See also Stevenson (1937, 13), Harman (1977, 33), 
Blackburn (1984, 188), and Ridge (2014, ch. 2 and 229).  
23 Blackburn (1998, 70).  
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Gibbard says something similar. Like Blackburn, Gibbard maintains 
that expressivism regarding ought judgments “must be right.”24 The 
problem with realism is that it “downplays choice” by “treating acting” 
as “an afterthought.” Prominent versions of realism “leave us concept-
ually in the lurch, with no refined concepts for thinking” our “way to 
decision.”25 Expressivism, by contrast, furnishes an account of moral 
judgments according to which they are tailor-made to move us to 
action. In Gibbard’s case, this is because some just are decisions to act; 
as such, they are intrinsically motivating “by definition.”26 If these 
philosophers are right, moral judgment must consist in something 
other than the mere apprehension of a moral fact or the acceptance of 
a moral proposition. 
When the claim that moral judgments are intrinsically motivating 
is deployed as a premise against moral realism, expressivists defend: 
The Motivation Argument 
(1) Moral judgments are intrinsically motivating: it is 
conceptually necessary that if an agent judges that she 
morally ought to act in a certain way, then she is moti-
vated to some degree to act in that way.  
 
(2) If moral judgments express moral beliefs, then 
moral judgments are not intrinsically motivating.  
 
(3) So, moral judgments do not express moral beliefs. 
 
(4) If moral judgments do not express moral beliefs, 
then there are no moral facts.27  
 
(5) So, there are no moral facts.  
                                                 
24 Gibbard (2003, 7). 
25 Gibbard (2003, 10-11); cf. also p. 13  
26 Ibid., 17 and 219. Cp. Gibbard (2012, 224).  
27 This formulation of the argument probably comes closest to Thomson (1996). 
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The thought behind the argument’s last premise is this: it would be 
bizarre if moral facts were to exist and yet for moral thought and 
discourse not to express beliefs, which represent them. For suppose 
moral facts were to exist. If they were, then they would guide action; 
this (in part) is what we mean when we say that these facts are practical. 
But if these facts were to guide action, then at least some of them 
would be within our ken, for only then could they play their action-
guiding role. If moral facts were within our ken, however, then 
presumably moral judgments would accurately represent some of 
them. It is difficult to see what would stand in the way.  
We can approach the matter from the opposite angle. Suppose that 
moral judgments were not to express moral beliefs, as the antecedent 
of (4) states. Then positing moral facts would appear to be entirely 
superfluous; they would explain nothing regarding the nature of moral 
judgment or action, as there would be no apparent sense in which 
moral judgments tracked these facts. But if so, then we have powerful 
reasons not to accept any theory that implies that they exist. Either way 
you look at things, we have good reason to accept (4), the final premise 
of The Motivation Argument.     
While there are reasons to reject some of the premises of The 
Motivational Argument and the grounds offered in their favor, I pro-
pose to bracket these reasons for present purposes. Instead, I wish to 
focus on why someone might accept the argument’s first premise. This 
premise is not supposed to be the fruit of high-level theorizing. Rather, 
it is supposed to be something that emerges from reflection on the 
nature of ordinary moral thought and practice. To claim something like 
“Yes, I sincerely believe that I ought not to murder, but I am not 
against it” appears paradoxical. How could one sincerely believe that 
one ought not to murder and not be against it?28  
In this sense, advocates of The Motivation Argument defer to 
apparent features of well-formed ordinary moral thought and dis-
course. But with respect to other apparent truths in the neighborhood, 
there appears to be no comparable deference. For consider No 
Slaughter. Like the first premise of The Motivation Argument, it has 
                                                 
28 Gibbard (2012, 224, 232) states a point in the vicinity as follows: “It is conceptually 
inconsistent to believe that I ought right now to do a thing and act otherwise…. it is conceptually 
inconsistent to accept ‘ought’ and reject ‘Do!’.” 
13
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an excellent claim to being a truth to which sincere participants in 
ordinary moral practice are committed. Indeed, if what I said earlier is 
correct, it looks as if a minimally eccentric, non-deviant moral system 
must include it. And yet to accept the conclusion of The Motivation 
Argument is to reject No Slaughter.  
This yields an apparent tension. For suppose we concede, for 
argument’s sake, that if moral judgments express moral beliefs, then 
these judgments are not intrinsically motivating. Why should we take 
this to be a reason to reject No Slaughter rather than the first premise 
of The Motivation Argument? After all, both the first premise of this 
argument and No Slaughter appear to be truths deeply embedded in 
(or presupposed by) well-formed ordinary moral and thought and 
practice. Accordingly, it is difficult to see why we should accept:  
Argument A: It is conceptually necessary that moral 
judgments are intrinsically motivating. If this is right, 
however, then moral judgments do not express moral 
beliefs. And if this is so, then there are no moral facts. 
Suppose, now, that an agent does the unthinkable, 
slaughtering fellow persons for recreation. It follows 
that No Slaughter is false: for an agent who acts in this 
way does not thereby exhibit a moral demerit, such as 
having acted wrongly.  
rather than embrace: 
Argument B: If an agent recreationally slaughters 
fellow persons, then he thereby exhibits a moral 
demerit, such as having acted wrongly. Suppose that an 
agent does the unthinkable: he slaughters others for 
recreation. It follows that he exhibits the moral demerit 
of having acted wrongly. But if so, then moral facts 
exist. Suppose, however, it is true that, if moral judg-
ments do not express moral beliefs, then there are no 
moral facts. This implies that, if moral facts exist, then 
moral judgments express moral beliefs. Given the truth 
of premise (2), the first premise of The Motivation 
Argument must be false: it is possible for an agent to 
judge that she morally ought to act in some way, but 
not be motivated to do so.  
14





This, at any rate, is the challenge I wish to pose to proponents of The 
Motivation Argument. Since it owes a debt to the style of argument 
that G. E. Moore pressed against skeptics regarding the external world, 
I will call it the Moorean-style Objection.29  
In principle, the Moorean-style Objection can be met. An adequate 
reply would be one in which proponents of The Motivation Argument 
identify reasons why we should embrace Argument A rather than 
Argument B. The issue before us is whether there are such reasons. 
It might appear that there clearly are such reasons. As a first move, 
friends of The Motivation Argument could simply concede that 
traditional versions of expressivism, which deny that there is any inter-
esting sense in which No Slaughter is true, are vulnerable to the charge 
of arbitrariness. But they will also insist, however, that sophisticated 
versions of the view are not. The reason is that sophisticated expres-
sivists can distinguish two interpretations of No Slaughter, maintaining 
that the Moorean-style Objection goes through against only one such 
interpretation.  
Under the first interpretation—call it the robust reading—No 
Slaughter reports a robust fact or truth, something that can form the 
representational content of our moral judgments. Under the second 
interpretation—call it the deflated reading—No Slaughter does not report 
any such fact or truth. Rather, it reports a “deflated fact” of the sort to 
which Blackburn alludes when he says that, according to sophisticated 
expressivists, there is a domain of moral facts that do not “answer to” 
our moral judgments. Accordingly, under the deflated reading, to ac-
cept No Slaughter is not to predicate of recreational slaughter the 
property of being wrong or to represent a moral fact. Rather, it is 
simply to express a first-order ethical judgment that condemns recrea-
tional slaughter.  
                                                 
29 See Moore (1953). McPherson (2009) notes that, interestingly, Moore himself 
never employed this type of strategy when defending his own metaethical views. 
McPherson goes on to suggest that there might be a reason for this, as the Moorean 
strategy is less plausible when applied in metaethics. It is worth emphasizing, though, 
that the Moorean strategy that McPherson considers is more ambitious than the one 
I employ here. For the strategy I employ counsels not that we reject Argument A in 
favor of Argument B but only that we have no more reason to accept Argument A 
rather than Argument B.  
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Blackburn develops this last claim by appealing to what he calls 
“Ramsey’s Ladder.”30 Suppose I say that: 
“It is wrong to recreationally slaughter fellow persons.” 
In doing so, says Blackburn, I would be putting forth a first-order 
ethical claim. I could embellish this first-order claim, saying the sorts 
of things that philosophers say when engaging in metaethics, uttering 
sentences such as:  
“It is true that it is wrong to recreationally slaughter fel-
low persons.” 
  
“It is a necessary objective fact that it is wrong to 
recreationally slaughter fellow persons.”  
and:  
“It is an unalterable, objective, eternal fact of the uni-
verse that it is wrong to recreationally slaughter fellow 
persons.” 
According to Ramsey’s Ladder, however, it would be a mistake to think 
that when I go on to say these things I would have somehow said 
something over and above what I said when I put forth the initial first-
order ethical claim. For these sentences are notational variants of one 
another; indeed, Blackburn says that they all mean the same thing.31 
For, in each case, when I express the judgment that recreational 
slaughter of fellow persons is wrong, I am simply expressing my 
commitment to condemning such slaughter no matter what the cir-
cumstances in which it may take place (and perhaps enjoining others 
to do so too).32  
                                                 
30 Blackburn (1998, ch. 3).  
31 See Blackburn (1998, 78-9 and 295-8).  
32 See Blackburn (1993, 153), Gibbard (2003, 7), and also Bennett (1993). Earlier I 
alluded to the fact that when characterizing their view, expressivists tend to offer 
accounts of not what it is for a moral claim to be true but what it is for someone to 
judge, accept, or say that a claim is true. Although I believe this tendency obscures 
important issues that divide expressivists from realists, in my characterization of their 
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With this distinction between different readings of No Slaughter 
before us, let us return to the Moorean-style Objection. The Moorean-
style Objection, say defenders of The Motivation Argument, assumes 
the truth of the first interpretation we just identified—the robust 
reading—according to which moral judgments have moral represent-
ational content. But in this context—or so these philosophers 
contend—the robust interpretation is not something that can be 
simply assumed, for it incorporates an account of the way in which 
moral thought functions which is precisely what defenders of The 
Motivation Argument reject. To make the Moorean-style Objection 
stick, realists would need to furnish an additional argument that theirs 
is the better interpretation of No Slaughter, which they do not.  
This response seems to me basically correct. Advocates of the 
Moorean-style argument cannot simply assume that the robust reading 
is correct. Still, I doubt that this response goes far enough, since it 
threatens simply to relocate the problem to which the Moorean-style 
Objection draws our attention. To see why, it is helpful to have firmly 
in mind the strategy that defenders of The Motivation Argument 
employ. When faced with the Moorean-style Objection, defenders of 
The Motivation Argument propose that we take the argument’s first 
premise at face value; the claim that moral judgments are intrinsically 
motivating says exactly what it appears to say. They then suggest that 
No Slaughter is different, for it admits of two interpretations—one 
which assumes that moral thought is representational, the other of 
which does not. Under the first interpretation—the robust reading—
No Slaughter should be rejected, for it is incompatible with the claim 
that moral judgments are intrinsically motivating. Under the second—
the deflated reading—it is not. Defenders of this strategy then propose 
to accept both the claim that moral judgments are intrinsically 
motivating and No Slaughter, albeit the latter under the deflated 
reading.    
It will be convenient to have a way of referring to this last 
combination of claims, which conjoins the claim that moral judgments 
are intrinsically motivating with No Slaughter under the deflated read-
ing. Let us call it the expressivist pairing. Those who advocate the expres-
                                                 
view I have not marked this distinction. Cuneo (forthcoming) addresses the issue at 
greater length.   
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sivist pairing (such as Blackburn, under a natural reading) often 
advertise it as the natural position to accept.33 In a moment, I will 
indicate why this strikes me as dubious. In the meanwhile, the point I 
wish to press is that employing this strategy is risky, for it is a strategy 
that realists can mimic to neutralize The Motivation Argument.  
Consider a realist who says that there is a default reading of No 
Slaughter, which is its face-value sense. According to the face-value 
interpretation, No Slaughter says exactly what it seems to say: it is 
wrong to recreationally slaughter fellow persons. To accept No 
Slaughter, accordingly, is not simply to issue a first-order moral 
judgment in which one condemns such slaughter. Rather, it is to 
attribute being wrong to the slaughter of fellow persons or to represent 
the fact that it is wrong to recreationally slaughter fellow persons.  
In this regard, realists maintain, accepting No Slaughter is exactly 
like making other prosaic normative judgments. Consider, for example, 
sentences such as the following: 
“You are required to file an affidavit within 24 hours.”  
 
“You should never use a water glass to serve wine.”  
 
“Unless you really know what you’re doing, you should 
avoid playing a diminished scale against a major seven 
chord.”  
 
“If the play at second base is close, then the manager 
has a right to dispute the call.” 
In ordinary contexts, sentences such as these express normative judg-
ments such as that you are required to file an affidavit within 24 hours 
or that one ought to avoid playing a diminished scale against a major 
seven chord. These judgments are normative because they express 
claims about how one should act or how one should evaluate an action, 
which can provide reasons to act or evaluate someone’s action.34 
                                                 
33 Blackburn (1998, ch. 3) and (2005, ch. 5).  
34 I realize that others use the term “normativity” more narrowly to designate 
properties or facts that are necessarily reason-giving. I am using the term in a more 
inclusive sense.  
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Indeed, to my knowledge, no one maintains that to judge that one is 
required to, say, file an affidavit within 24 hours is merely to endorse 
the action of filing an affidavit within 24 hours. For, among other 
things, one could be so deeply averse to performing this action that 
one is entirely unmoved to do so. If so, realists maintain, we have 
strong reason to accept the face value reading of No Slaughter. The 
reason is that, on the face of things, what goes for the semantics of 
other normative judgments should also go for ethical ones. If other 
normative judgments, such as those expressed by the sentences offered 
above have normative representational content—as they appear to—
then we should say the same of moral judgments, all else being equal. 
If the deflated reading were correct, however, then this sort of parity 
would not hold. And, if it did not, expressivism would imply massive 
lexical ambiguity with regard to the meaning of normative terms.35  
Realists, then, maintain that we should accept No Slaughter under 
its face-value interpretation, according to which it has moral repre-
sentational content. They then propose to disambiguate the claim that 
moral judgments are intrinsically motivating. This claim, realists main-
tain, admits of two readings.  
Under the first—call it the descriptive reading—it says what propo-
nents of The Motivation Argument claim: it is impossible that an agent 
judge that she morally ought to act in a certain way and not be 
motivated to act in that way. However, under the second reading—call 
it the normative reading—the claim that moral judgments are intrinsically 
motivating is implicitly normative. Under this interpretation, the first 
premise of The Motivation Argument says something like:  
Moral judgments are intrinsically motivating: it is con-
ceptually necessary that if an agent judges that she 
morally ought to act in a certain way, then she is 
motivated to some degree to act in that way, provided 
that her judgment is well-formed.  
                                                 
35 Wodak (2017) develops this point in considerable detail, concluding that expres-
sivists have neither appreciated nor met the challenge that faces their view. Cp. 
Chrisman (2011).   
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In principle, realists can understand the “well-formedness” of moral 
judgments in different ways. One such way is to take inspiration from 
the expressivists themselves, such as Gibbard.36  
Suppose that operative within ordinary agents are two types of 
systems. On the one hand is the representational system, which is 
(roughly) a cluster of capacities whose aim is to represent the world in 
certain ways—the outputs of which include judgments with represent-
ational content. On the other is the motivational system, which is 
roughly a constellation of propensities to be moved to act in certain 
ways, which include instincts, desires, and emotions of various sorts. 
These two systems do not operate independently of one another. 
Rather, they work together when outputs from the representational 
system, such as the belief that an action would be fatal to one’s loved 
ones, yield appropriate affective states, such as fear or aversion. A well-
formed judgment, we can say, is the output of these two systems 
working together as they should.  
Moral judgments, according to this way of seeing things, can also 
be well-formed. They are well-formed when judgments—such as that 
an action is morally required—yield motivational states of the appro-
priate sort, such as a desire or intention to perform that action. If this 
is right, were a judgment that an action is required fail to yield such an 
affective state, then it would be malformed; it would be like a belief 
that an action would be fatal to one’s loved ones but nonetheless fails 
to yield any desire to prevent it.  
For present purposes, we needn’t develop the details of this type 
of approach (although we could, in principle, do so in several ways by 
offering an account of the nature of the representational and motiva-
tional systems). The important point to see is that realists have avail-
able a strategy that mimics that used by sophisticated expressivists. The 
strategy consists in taking No Slaughter at face value, interpreting it as 
that which is represented by judgments that express genuine moral 
representational content. It then dictates that we disambiguate the first 
premise of The Motivation Argument, distinguishing two interpret-
ations—the descriptive reading, on the one hand, and the normative 
reading, on the other. Under the first interpretation, the claim that 
moral judgments are intrinsically motivating should be rejected, for it 
                                                 
36 Gibbard (1990, ch. 4). See also Blackburn (1998, 131).  
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is incompatible with No Slaughter (at least if The Motivation Argu-
ment goes through). Under the second interpretation, the claim that 
moral judgments are intrinsically motivating is not incompatible with 
No Slaughter. Defenders of this strategy then propose to accept both 
No Slaughter and the claim that moral judgments are intrinsically 
motivating, albeit only under the second, normative reading. 
For ease of reference, let’s call this last combination of claims the 
realist pairing. While there is evidence, I believe, for accepting the realist 
pairing, it might be that accepting it comes at a theoretical price.37 
Perhaps in some respects it is less elegant than the expressivist pairing. 
If this were right, then both the expressivist and the realist pairings 
would display theoretical imperfections. Be that as it may, the 
conclusion with which we’re left is this. 
The Motivation Argument presents a challenge to moral realism, 
one which appeals to the intrinsically motivating character of moral 
judgments. But the argument goes through—and avoids the Moorean-
style Objection—only if we accept what I’ve called the expressivist 
pairing. This pairing, recall, involves accepting the first premise of The 
Motivation Argument at face value but No Slaughter under the 
deflated reading. However, we’ve seen that there is another way to 
approach the argument, which consists in accepting what I’ve called 
the realist pairing. This pairing consists in accepting No Slaughter at 
face value and the normative reading of the first premise of The 
Motivation Argument. Accepting the realist pairing enables one to 
hold that moral judgments are intrinsically motivating without being 
committed to a view that succumbs to either The Motivation Argu-
ment or the Moorean-style Objection.  
Which pairing should we accept? The Motivation Argument itself 
will not settle the issue. If so, the argument itself is not a reason to 
accept expressivism. At this point in the dialectic, we need a new 
argument for why we should accept the expressivist pairing rather than 
the realist one.  
Let me summarize the objection I have developed: reflection on 
ordinary moral thought and practice seems to reveal that: 
                                                 
37 For some of the evidence, see Roskies (2003).  
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Moral judgments are intrinsically motivating: it is con-
ceptually necessary that if an agent judges that she 
morally ought to act in a certain way, then she is motiv-
ated to some degree to act in that way. 
It also seems to reveal that:  
It is wrong to recreationally slaughter fellow persons. 
Proponents of The Motivation Argument reject this second claim on 
the basis of the first. The Moorean-style Objection charges that doing 
so would be arbitrary. Why, after all, shouldn’t we argue the reverse, 
rejecting the claim that moral judgments are intrinsically motivating on 
the strength of No Slaughter?  
This charge of arbitrariness could, in principle, be satisfactorily 
addressed. Advocates of The Motivation Argument propose to do so 
by accepting the expressivist pairing, according to which we accept the 
claim that moral judgments are intrinsically motivating at face value 
together with No Slaughter under a deflated reading. Realists counter, 
however, by presenting the realist pairing, according to which we 
accept No Slaughter at face value but accept the claim that moral 
judgments are intrinsically motivating under a normative interpret-
ation.38 To generate the results they want, proponents of The Motiva-
tion Argument must accept the expressivist pairing. But it is difficult 
to see why they should. The Motivation Argument itself offers no 
support for accepting this pairing.  
3. Replies 
At the outset of the last section, I quoted passages from both 
Blackburn and Gibbard in which they state that expressivism must be 
true, since it explains the intrinsically motivating character of moral 
judgments while realism does not. These passages certainly give the 
impression that, in their view, The Motivation Argument (or some-
                                                 
38 Expressivists could, I believe, accept a normative interpretation of the claim that 
moral judgments are intrinsically motivating. Indeed, Blackburn (2001, 31-2) gestures 
at such a reading when discussing the aesthetic expressivist. Accepting a normative 
interpretation of The Motivation Argument’s first premise would, however, come at 
a cost: it would provide no reason to reject realism.  
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thing close to it) is sufficient to establish the truth of their favored 
position; there is no need to appeal to other sorts of considerations. I 
have argued that this is mistaken. We should not accept expressivism 
on the strength of The Motivation Argument, as realists have a good 
response to it that does not require them to reject any of its premises. 
If this is right, the debate between realists and expressivists will need 
to be played out on other grounds. This, I believe, is the lesson to be 
learned from the Moorean-style Objection.  
In closing, I would like to consider what I take to be the natural 
strategy of reply to the Moorean-style Objection, which is to furnish 
additional reasons for thinking that we should accept the expressivist 
pairing rather than the realist one. In principle, these reasons could 
come from far afield, drawing upon considerations that have nothing 
directly to do with moral thought or motivation. To keep things 
manageable, then, I will consider a pair of replies culled from the writ-
ings of expressivists themselves that concern the nature of moral 
thought.  
The first reply draws upon Gibbard’s early work in which he 
develops an expressivist view according to which there are systems of 
norms—roughly, imperatives of various sorts—that allow, forbid, or 
require actions of various sorts.39 According to this approach, when 
an agent judges that it would be wrong to act in some way, she 
endorses a system of norms that either permits or requires blaming the 
perform-ance of such an action. In a well-known passage, Gibbard 
explains why we should accept this account of moral judgment rather 
than one according to which moral judgments express moral 
representational content:  
What, though, of the special element that makes 
normative thought and language normative? There is 
such an element, I am claiming, and it involves a kind 
of endorsement—an endorsement that any descriptiv-
istic analysis treats inadequately. The problem is not 
merely that every time one loophole in the analysis is 
                                                 
39 Gibbard (1990, ch. 1).   
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closed, others remain. It is that a single loophole re-
mains unpluggable by descriptivistic analysis.40 
The argument seems to be this: moral thought is of its very nature 
normative. For moral thought to be normative, however, it must 
involve endorsement, as that is what the normativity of judgment 
consists in. But if moral realism were true, then moral judgments 
wouldn’t necessarily involve endorsement. Hence, it would follow that, 
according to realism, moral thought is not normative, which is absurd.  
Realists have increasingly pointed out that arguments such as this 
fail to make contact with their position. The problem is that expres-
sivists and realists think of normativity differently.41 As expressivists 
view things, normativity is primarily a psychological phenomenon. For 
a judgment to be normative is, in their view, for it to involve an element 
of endorsement or commendation, something that has motivating 
power. Realists, by contrast, do not think of normativity in psycholog-
ical terms. Indeed, according to realists, it is best to think of 
normativity not (in the first instance at least) as a feature of judgments 
so much as a feature of facts or states of affairs. What feature of facts 
or states of affairs is it? About this matter, there is disagreement.42 But 
if we are thinking of normativity in terms of something’s having 
reason-giving power, then realists would say that normativity consists 
in a thing’s favoring or justifying one or another response on our 
part—where the favoring relation is not to be identified with an agent’s 
favoring or being for that response.  
Many realists have, of course, defended the claim that moral facts 
are normative in this last, reason-giving sense. If they are right, 
Gibbard’s argument would have bite against their view only if his 
argument were to imply that being normative in this reason-giving 
sense were not enough for being genuinely normative. But Gibbard’s 
argument does not imply anything of this sort; hence, the diagnosis 
that it fails to make contact with realist positions. 
                                                 
40 Gibbard (1990, 33); cp. p. 10.  
41 Parfit (2011, ch. 28) presses this point. Cp. Parfit (2017, ch. 48).  
42 See Copp (2007, ch. 8). 
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This point having been noted, it is worth stressing there is a more 
concessive reply to Gibbard’s argument available, which is that realists 
can accommodate the claim that moral judgments are normative in the 
sense that Gibbard has in mind. Provided that we have well-formed 
moral judgments in view, realists can maintain that, necessarily, moral 
judgments have motivational force or are normative in Gibbard’s 
sense. This (in part) was the point of presenting what I have called the 
realist pairing. If such a view were correct, the contents of some moral 
judgments would be normative in the sense that realists accept and 
these judgments would also be normative in the sense that 
expressivists accept. Under this view, there is no need to choose 
between different conceptions of normativity; one can maintain that 
moral judgments of a certain range exhibit both sorts. 43  
Let me now turn to a second reply to the Moorean-style Objection, 
which draws upon Gibbard’s later work. In Thinking How To Live, 
Gibbard considers the possibility that there might be a property such 
as the all-things-considered ought, writing: 
ought questions and reason questions are by their very 
nature questions of what to do… I the chooser don’t 
face two clear, distinct questions, the question what to 
do and the question what I ought to do. Descriptivism, 
in contrast, is the doctrine that ought claims describe 
rather than prescribe, that an ought claim describes an 
act as having a certain special property. This gives the 
wrong picture, we expressivists say: ought claims instead 
are claims about what to do…. 
We should explain thinking what to do as moving 
toward action, and then explain the term ‘ought’ 
accordingly, as one I can use to couch my frame of 
mind when I decide. Don’t look for some one property 
I can attribute which can serve as an all-purpose 
deciding factor, as if attributing a property could sub-
stitute for acting…. 
My point here is to worry how invoking a property, 
and saying that it is picked out by the term ‘ought,’ 
                                                 
43 See Copp (2001) and (2008) and the references in n. 6.   
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could explain decision. How can all the questions I ask 
in deliberating be relevant only in bearing on the one 
question: which alternative has this special property?44   
The core of Gibbard's concerns about what he calls “descriptiv-
ism” is that normative or “ought thoughts” are about what to do. But 
positing a property such as being what one ought to do, Gibbard maintains, 
would not help to explain the choices we make or the ways we act. If 
this is true, then there is no need to say that when an agent judges that 
she ought on the whole to act in a certain way she thereby grasps the 
property being what she ought to do. However, once this property drops 
out, then—the claim is—so also does the need to appeal to normative 
representational content regarding oughts.45 
We should not, I believe, be moved by this argument, at least if it 
is supposed to provide reasons for thinking that moral properties 
would make no difference to explaining what we do.46 Consider an 
analogue: suppose I am a lawyer who has been hired to defend a client. 
A colleague pokes her head in my office, uttering the sentence:  
“You are required to file an affidavit within 24 hours.”  
In ordinary conditions, this sentence expresses normative representa-
tional content, since it concerns a requirement that can be a reason to 
act. Would a property such as being legally required play an explanatory 
role, helping to explain the choices I make? It would seem so. By 
determining that I have a legal obligation to submit an affidavit in the 
next 24 hours, for example, I can decide what to do. Or, alternatively, 
suppose I ascertain that my colleague has a decisive reason to file an 
affidavit in the next 24 hours. If I discover that she does, I can 
determine whether she is liable to correction or blame if she fails to do 
so. If this is so, ascertaining whether actions have normative properties 
can help explain not only choices but also how to evaluate actions.  
                                                 
44 Gibbard (2003, 10).  
45 See Gibbard (2003), especially, pp. 10, 50, and 180-1. See, also, Blackburn (1998, 
87).  
46 It might be that Gibbard’s argument is best interpreted as assuming that non-
natural properties would make no difference to choice. I believe this assumption is 
also mistaken for reasons that FitzPatrick (2018) presents.  
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With morality it is, presumably, no different. Imagine that I am not 
only legally but also morally required to file an affidavit within 24 
hours, since failing to do so would be grossly negligent. By determining 
that I am morally required to file the affidavit, I can decide what to do. 
And if I see that my colleague has decisive moral reason to also file an 
affidavit, I can determine whether she is liable to admonition or 
reproach if she fails to so. If this is right, we should not deny that moral 
judgments lack normative representational content because the objects 
of such content—namely, moral properties of facts—would not help 
explain why we act or evaluate actions in the ways that we do. To the 
contrary, that they would explain such things appears to be built into 
their very job description.  
References 
 
Ayer, A. J. 1936. Language, Truth, and Logic. Gollancz. 
Bennett, Jonathan. 1993. “The Necessity of Moral Judgments.” Ethics 
103: 458-73. 
Blackburn, Simon. 1984. Spreading the Word. Oxford University Press.  
Blackburn, Simon. 1993. Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford University 
Press. 
Blackburn, Simon. 1998. Ruling Passions. Oxford University Press. 
Blackburn, Simon. 1999. “Is Objective Moral Justification Possible on 
a Quasi-realist Foundation?” Inquiry 42: 213-28.  
Blackburn, Simon. 2001. “Reply by Simon Blackburn.” Philosophical 
Books 42 (symposium on Blackburn’s Ruling Passions): 1-32.  
Blackburn, Simon. 2005. Truth: A Guide for the Perplexed. Oxford 
University Press.  
Blackburn, Simon. 2010. “Truth, Beauty and Goodness.” Oxford Studies 
in Metaethics, 5. Oxford University Press: 295-314.  
Boisvert, Daniel. 2008. “Expressive-Assertivism.” Pacific Philosophical 
Quarterly 89: 169-203.  
Chrisman, Matthew. 2008. “Expressivism, Inferentialism, and Saving 
the Debate.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LXXVII: 334-
56. 
Chrisman, Matthew. 2011. “Expressivism, Inferentialism and the 
Theory of Meaning.” In Michael Brady, ed. New Waves in Metaethics. 
Palgrave: 103-25.  
27
Cuneo: Should We be Moved  by What Motivates Expressivism?




Copp, David. 2001. “Realist-Expressivism: A Neglected Option for 
Moral Realism,” Social Philosophy and Policy 18: 1-43. 
Copp, David. 2007. Morality in a Natural World. Oxford University 
Press.  
Copp, David. 2008. “Realist Expressivism and Conventional 
Implicature.” Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 4. Oxford University 
Press: 167-202.  
Cuneo, Terence and Russ Shafer-Landau. 2014. “The Moral Fixed 
Points: New Directions for Moral Nonnaturalism.” Philosophical 
Studies 171: 399-443. 
Cuneo, Terence. 2008. “Moral Realism, Quasi-realism, and 
Skepticism.” In John Greco, ed. The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. 
Oxford University Press: 176-99. 
Cuneo, Terence. 2014. Speech and Morality. Oxford University Press. 
Cuneo, Terence. forthcoming. “Can Expressivism Have it All?” 
Philosophical Studies. 
Dreier, James. 2004. “Meta-ethics and the Problem of Creeping 
Miminalism.” In John Hawthorne, ed. Philosophical Perspectives 18, 
Ethics. Blackwell: 23-44.  
Enoch, David. 2011. Taking Morality Seriously. Oxford University Press.  
FitzPatrick, William. 2018. “Representing Ethical Reality: A Guide for 
Worldly Non-naturalists.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48: 548-68. 
Foot, Philippa. 2002. Virtues and Vices. Oxford University Press.  
Gibbard, Allan. 1990. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. Harvard University 
Press. 
Gibbard, Allan. 2003. Thinking How To Live. Harvard University Press. 
Gibbard, Allan. 2012. Meaning and Normativity. Oxford University Press. 
Hare, John. 2003. God’s Call. Eerdmans.  
Hare, R. M. 1952. The Language of Morals. Oxford University Press. 
Harman, Gilbert. 1977. The Nature of Morality. Oxford University Press.  
Horgan, Terry and Mark Timmons. 2000. “Nondescriptivist 
Cognitivism: Framework for a New Metaethic.” Philosophical Papers 
99: 121-53.  
Horgan, Terry and Mark Timmons. 2006. “Morality without Moral 
Facts.” In James Dreier, eds. Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory 
Blackwell: 220-38. 
McGrath, Sarah. 2014. “Relax! Don’t Do It! Why Moral Realism Won’t 
Come Cheap.” Oxford Studies in Metaethics 9. Oxford University 
Press: 186-214.  
28





McPherson, Tristram. 2009. “Moorean Arguments and Moral 
Revisionism.” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 3: 1-24. 
Moore, G. E. 1953. Some Main Problems of Philosophy. George Allwn & 
Unwin. 
Parfit, Derek. 2011. On What Matters, Volumes I and II. Oxford 
University Press.  
Parfit, Derek. 2017. On What Matters, Volume III. Oxford University 
Press.  
Reid, Thomas. 2010. Essays on the Active Powers of Man. Edited by Knud 
Haakonssen and James Harris. Edinburgh University Press.  
Ridge, Michael. 2014. Impassioned Belief. Oxford University Press. 
Roskies, Adina. 2003. “Are Ethical Judgments Instrinsically 
Motivational? Lessons from Acquired Sociopathy.” Philosophical 
Psychology 16: 51-66. 
Rosen, Gideon. 1998. “Blackburn’s Essays in Quasi-Realism.” Noûs 
32: 386-45.  
Schroeder. Mark. 2009. “Hybrid Expressivism: Virtues and Vices.” 
Ethics 119: 257-309. 
Street, Sharon. 2016. “Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Re-think 
It.” Oxford Studies in Metaethics 11: 293-334. 
Stevenson, C. L. 1937. “The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms.” 
Mind 46: 14-31.  
Thomson, J. J. 1996. “Emotivism.” In Gilbert Harman and J. J. 
Thomson. Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity. Blackwell.  
Timmons, Mark. 1999. Morality without Foundations. Oxford University 
Press.  
29
Cuneo: Should We be Moved  by What Motivates Expressivism?
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport,
